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Much has been said about 9/11, but little research has been done on the 
impact the events had on Africa. This paper explores how Muslims in East 
Africa view the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Particular attention will be given to 
the case of Kenya. What were the effects and consequences of 9/11 for 
Muslim communities there? How do they perceive the “war on terrorism”, 
how did the changing configuration of geopolitics in the aftermath of 9/11 
affect their lives and attitudes? What are the future prospects of Christian-
Muslim understanding in East Africa? The paper argues that the initial 
sentiment of sympathy with the victims has been replaced by the rise of 
anti-American attitudes among the East African Muslim population. 
Although this tendency will probably continue as long as policy makers 
think of anti-Americanism in terms of an “image problem”, the impact of 
9/11 on East Africa will in the long run not depend on global issues, but on 
the course of political and religious developments on the national and local 
levels. 
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1
East African Muslims after 9/11 
Introduction 
Much has been said about 9/11, but little research has been done on the 
impact the events had on Africa.1 In several respects, the post-9/11 era has 
dramatically brought to a head earlier trends connected with the “age of 
neoliberalism”. Democracy and capitalist market economy, the two basic 
ingredients of “Western civilization” which seemed to be gaining ground all 
over the world, suddenly appeared to be under a serious threat. To some 
observers, the events of 9/11 suggested that the deprived may no longer be 
willing to accept the gap between the rich and the poor as a matter of 
destiny. Moreover, the events made it clear that there was a group of 
radicals who were ready to fight “the West” with all available means – up to 
and including weapons mass destruction. In short, the world seemed to be 
on the edge of the often quoted “clash of civilizations”.2 
In this paper, I propose to explore the myths and realities of the “clash of 
civilizations” by looking at the impact of 9/11 on Muslim communities in 
East Africa. Needless to say, as a religious setting East Africa is too 
complex to be covered in a short working paper. I therefore focus my 
attention on the case of Kenya, where I have conducted research on Islamic 
education over the last three years. I will also refer to Tanzania, Kenya’s 
southern neighbor. The questions I would like to address include how 
Muslims perceive the “war on terrorism”, and how the changing 
configuration of geopolitics in the aftermath of 9/11 has affected their lives 
and attitudes. I also intend to look at the future prospects of inter-religious 
dialogue and Christian-Muslim understanding in East Africa. As I will 
argue, the impact of 9/11 on East Africa will in the long run not depend on 
global issues, but on the course of political and religious developments on 
the national and local levels. 
                                                 
1  Among the few studies that do address 9/11 in the African context are Nielinger 2002 and 
Souley 2002. 
2  The phrase “clash of civilizations” is usually attributed to Samuel Huntington (1993). 
However, the first author to popularize the idea with reference to the Muslim world was 
Bernard Lewis (Lewis ). 
 
 




9/11 and its significance from a Muslim perspective 
Before addressing the East African context, I would like to make a few 
general remarks about the significance of 9/11 from a Muslim perspective. 
Many Muslims feel that 9/11 has served as a pretext to justify all kinds of 
suppressive measures against Muslims. Sometimes this attitude finds its 
expression in conspiracy theories, such as “it is impossible that the 
perpetrators were Muslims, as Muslims have suffered most after 9/11, while 
the Jews are the ones who benefited most.” Such a reading certainly stands 
on a weak basis. However, in a sense it reflects some of the developments 
that occurred in many countries all over the world in the aftermath of 9/11. 
Immediately after 9/11, many observers unanimously stated that “the 
world has changed profoundly and will never be as it has used to be.” 
Supposedly, the attack on America has ushered in a new era, an era 
characterized by a completely different kind of warfare, pitting the free and 
civilized world against an invisible enemy. The obvious problem with 
fighting invisible enemies is how to identify them. Of course, Osama Bin 
Laden emerged as the face of evil and terrorism, and the photos and 
biographies of the 19 attackers were widely publicized. But who else 
belongs into the category of the new Muslim terrorists? Many Western 
politicians − in America as well as in Europe − were quick in pointing out 
that Islam as such does not condone violence and that the real enemies are 
those who make use of religion to justify their terrorist agenda. Thus, they 
proceeded to putting the blame on the so-called Muslim fundamentalists, but 
one important question remained unanswered: Where can we draw the 
border between a “good Muslim” and an “evil fundamentalist”? What are 
the criteria on which the distinction can be based? The ambiguity is not just 
a reflection of the difficulty to distinguish a “good”, peaceful Muslim from a 
“bad”, violent fundamentalist – it is also points to the fact that 9/11 can 
indeed be used by interested parties – governments, political or religious 
organizations etc. – as a political tool against their rivals. 
 
 




Another important effect of 9/11 relevant to the present discussion is the rise 
of anti-American attitudes among Muslims. In December 2002, the 
renowned Washington-based Pew Research Center published the first part 
of its Global Attitudes Project, entitled What the world thinks in 2002.3 
Between July and October 2002, the project’s collaborators had conducted 
interviews with more than 38,000 respondents in 44 countries, gathering 
data on how people viewed their lives, their home countries, the global 
development, and the United States.  
 Among the African countries covered in the report were Senegal, Mali, 
Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Angola and South 
Africa. According to the Report, anti-American attitudes in these countries 
are much less widespread than in Asia, Europe, and Latin America and, as 
expected, in the Middle East. However, a comparison with earlier data that 
exists in some of the countries mentioned shows that anti-Americanism is 
clearly on the rise. In 1999, 94 % of the Kenyan population had a favorable 
opinion of the United States. By 2002, the percentage had decreased to 80 
%. This is still a high percentage – yet, as the authors of the Pew Report 
emphasize, there is a clear connection between the increase in anti-
American attitudes and the religious identity of the respondents: 
Significantly more Muslims than non-Muslims are critical of the “war 
against terror”, more Muslims than non-Muslims view the expansion of 
American culture as a threat to their religious and cultural identity. In 
Africa, the interviewers of the Global Attitudes Project selected some 
questions that they only directed at Muslim respondents. For example, the 
Muslims were asked whether they deemed suicide attacks as legitimate 
means to defend Islam. In Ivory Coast, 56% responded with “yes,” in 
Nigeria about half said “yes.” Meanwhile, in Mali, Senegal, Ghana, and 
Uganda the share of those agreeing was between one fourth and one third. 
At 18%, agreement was lowest among Muslims in Tanzania.4 This 
assessment is in line with country-specific differences in the responses to 
questions regarding the “war on terror” or the acceptance of American 
values. In countries with a large Muslim population, such as Mali or 
Senegal, the responses were much more negative than in countries with 
Muslim minorities. For example, about three fourths of all African 
respondents said they agreed with the “war on terror.” In Senegal, in 
contrast, 64% of respondents rejected the measure, and in Mali and among 
Nigeria’s Muslims the support was significantly lower than in other 
                                                 
3  Pew Research Center 2002. 
4  A summary and comments are available at  
 http://www.people-press.org/reports/display/php3?PageID=655 (December 3, 2002). Thus, 
the African results do not differ significantly from other Islamic countries covered by the 
survey (e.g., Indonesia, Pakistan, Jordan). 
 
 




countries surveyed (within and outside Africa).5 On questions examining 
perceptions of how far American culture had spread in Africa, there was a 
tendency among African Muslims to show greater concern than among non-
Muslims. More than 60 % of respondents in Mali, Senegal, and Tanzania, 
respectively, viewed the expansion of American culture as negative.6 
Thus, the question arises of whether 9/11 has indeed to be seen as the 
prelude to the clash of civilizations: Will Muslims unite against the West? 
Will the “war against terror”-policy of West – with America leading the 
“coalition of the willing” – push more and more Muslims into the radical 
corner? Let us try to answer these questions by looking at the case of Kenya, 
a country where Muslims are a minority of about 25 to 30 % of the 
population. 
Reactions to 9/11 in Kenya and beyond 
In late September 2001, several European TV stations aired a documentary 
film focusing on the global Islamic terrorist network. One longer portion of 
the film examined the attack on the U.S. embassy in Nairobi on August 7, 
1998, which claimed 256 lives, including 12 American casualties, and 
injured more than 5,000 people.7 At almost the same time, a bomb was 
detonated in front of the U.S. embassy in Dar es-Salaam, killing 13 people. 
Statements by Osama bin Laden, released later, led to the conclusion that  
al-Qa’ida was responsible for the strikes. The documentary’s authors very 
thoroughly gathered information on the history leading up to the Nairobi 
attack, information that was based on CIA research. With the exception of 
one Palestinian, who was married to a Kenyan and lived in the African 
country for an extended period of time, all men involved in the planning and 
execution of the attack hailed from Arab countries and none had personal 
ties in Kenya.8 
                                                 
5  Pew Research Center 2002: 60-61. In Muslim countries outside Africa, the “war on terror” 
was, according to the Pew Report, also rejected by the vast majority of the population. 
6  Ibid.: 63-64. These results were even higher in Germany, France, Indonesia, Bangladesh, 
and, of course, in the Middle East. 
7  The figures on the number of casualties of the Nairobi bomb attack vary between 213 and 
291. The number of people injured is probably higher than 5,000, though, as many of the 
slightly injured victims were not even treated medically (the enormous detonation caused 
many windows in surrounding skyscrapers and stores to burst). 
8  In October 2001, four defendants (one Jordanian, one Saudi citizen, one American born in 
Lebanon, and a Tanzanian) were sentenced to life-long sentences for their participation in 
the attacks in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam 
 (http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2001-10/19/article5.shtml, December 3, 2002). 
 
 




Toward the end, the documentary featured a short interview with Ali Shee, 
an Islamic preacher from Mombasa. When asked what Kenyan Muslims 
thought of Osama bin Laden, Shee responded: “He is a hero.” In the 
interview, Ali Shee, since the 1980s established as one of the most vocal 
critics of the Kenyan regime and an outspoken advocate of a radical 
interpretation of Islam9, came across as the personification of an anti-
American propaganda campaign, literally drawing African Muslims into this 
stream. When also taking into account that pictures of Osama bin Laden in 
form of T-shirts, posters, or bumper stickers have been highly popular in 
East Africa as well as in countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal, and 
Nigeria since September 11, 2001, one is tempted to conclude that bin 
Laden is viewed as the leader in a global Islamic fight for liberty for African 
Muslims, a man the people enthusiastically want to follow. If this 
assessment is, indeed, accurate, then the attacks in Nairobi and Dar es-
Salaam could be seen as the tip of an Islamist, militant, and anti-American 
iceberg, and the 9/11 attacks would have triggered a feeling of satisfaction 
among Muslims in East Africa. 
However, that impression is misleading.10 Bin Laden may have garnered 
admiration in Tanzania and Kenya, but he has not won the sympathy of 
Muslims. Similar to former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, who is hardly a 
man with Islamist ambitions, bin Laden symbolizes for East African 
Muslims the resistance against the global political and economic hegemony 
of the United States. Bin Laden is known as someone who has dared to 
stand up on his own against the world’s No. 1 superpower. The people 
praise his courage, but not his actions. They admire him as a pop icon, but 
not as a “holy warrior.” How strongly Bin Laden’s Islamic legitimization 
for terror is rejected in the East African region is reflected in the fact that 
Kenyan and Tanzanian Muslims continue to argue that the true perpetrators 
of the World Trade Center attack could never be Muslims, as Islam 
prohibits such violence. 
In fact, the reactions of Kenyan Muslims to 9/11 were similar to those 
that followed the earlier attack on the U.S. embassy in Nairobi. On August 
7, 1999, the first anniversary of the devastating strike, the Supreme Council 
of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM) had a statement read in all mosques around 
the country, saying: 
                                                 
9  On Shee, see Bakari 1995. 
10  The following paragraph is based on numerous interviews and informal discussions which 
the author conducted with Imams, religious scholars, and Muslim activists during field trips 
to Nairobi, Mombasa, Malindi and Zanzibar in August 2002 and February 2003. 
 
 




What would be the reason for planting bombs in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam if not to 
disrupt the spread of Islam in East Africa, which has been enhanced by the existing 
peaceful atmosphere?11 
In the Nairobi-based Jamia Mosque, Kenya’s largest, SUPKEM chairman 
Abdulghafur Busaidy gave a speech summarizing the painful experiences of 
Kenyan Muslims since the attack: sweeping suspicions of Muslims as 
terrorists, public defamation of Islam through the media, politicians, and 
church representatives, a ban of six Islamic non-governmental organizations 
which allegedly threatened domestic security, as well as confiscation of files 
and computer drives from offices of Islamic organizations.12 
Such statements reveal two basic features of how Muslims view the 
present situation: First, they reflect an interpretation of the events as part of 
a global fight of the United States or “the West” as a whole against Islam. 
On the other hand, they show that Muslims in Kenya and Tanzania are, 
based on their own experiences, fully aware of the negative impact that such 
terrorist attacks have when they are carried out in the name of Islam. For 
many, this is a sufficient reason to condemn and reject such violent action. 
Therefore, 9/11 and the subsequent “war on terror” did not have a 
mobilizing effect among East African Muslims. Instead, it revived 
memories of the August 7, 1998 attack, which was much more traumatic for 
Kenyans than the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.13 
Therefore, from a Kenyan perspective, it can hardly be claimed that “the 
world has changed on 9/11”. Rather, the crucial date, as far as Kenya is 
concerned, was indeed 8/7. In several respects, the developments after 9/11 
were a repetition of what Kenyans had experienced three years earlier: More 
NGOs were banned (for instance the Saudi-financed al-Haramayn), public 
statements against Islam surfaced again, and, perhaps more than before, 
Muslims became the object of the attention of security and intelligence. 
Posing as a loyal US ally in the “war against terror”, the Kenyan 
government allowed the CIA and the FBI to conduct their activities in 
Kenya, and Mombasa’s harbor served as a base for European and United 
States’ navies to monitor the shipping traffic on the Horn of Africa. 
                                                 
11  The Daily Nation (Nairobi, August 7, 1999). 
12  Ibid. 
13  For Muslim and non-Muslim Kenyans alike, the period following 9/11 confirmed the 
impression already gained since August 1998—that American lives are worth more than 
African ones: According to accounts widespread among Kenyans, the Israeli rescue troops, 
which were quickly rushed to the site, recovered the American casualties and injured first 
on the day of the attack, leaving the Kenyan victims behind. September 11, 2001 showed 
that the bomb explosion in Nairobi, despite its grave impact, did not even receive a fraction 








The prospects of “Islamic terrorism” in Kenya 
Still, the question remains whether the aftermath of 9/11 could, in the long 
term, lead to the emergence of Islamic terrorism in East Africa. Stefan Mair, 
a German political analyst working for the government-sponsored “Science 
and Politics Foundation” (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), has recently 
argued that the anti-American attitudes of African Muslims might develop 
into an „indigenous African terrorism“ if there were leaders able to incite 
the Muslim public.14 This opinion is matched by the assessment in 
American intelligence circles that Muslim hatred of the US could lead to 
organized violence against American citizens and institutions. 
However, a look at cases where Kenyan and Tanzanian Muslims became 
involved in violent confrontations over the last few years shows that 
violence only occurred when Muslims were the victims of repressive 
government measures. One example is the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) 
which was banned in the early 1990s and excluded from participating in the 
parliamentary and presidential election.15 At the time, the massive and 
occasionally violent police action against IPK followers triggered an 
extraordinary – and unrepeated – mobilization effect and solidarity among 
Kenyan Muslims. Similarly, the so-called Mwembechai killings, where 
Tanzanian security forces entered a mosque in a suburb of Dar es-Salaam 
and killed several Muslims on February 12, 1998, had local reasons.16 
In recent years, the U.S. Middle East policy repeatedly caused irritation 
among Muslims in Kenya and Tanzania. Still, that never fueled escalations 
on a similar scale as during the IPK ban in Mombasa or during the violent 
confrontations between Tanzanian Muslims and security forces in Dar es-
Salaam or Zanzibar. Especially since the second Intifada, there have been 
frequent anti-Israeli and anti-American demonstrations in Nairobi and 
Mombasa.17 However, apart from occasional clashes with police forces, the 
demonstrations did not turn into widespread violence. In mid-2002, a call 
for boycotting U.S. goods in Kenya was largely ignored. Lists were 
distributed in many mosques, urging the Muslims not to buy specific goods. 
But the issue was merely a temporary source of discussion. 
                                                 
14  Mair 2002. 
15  For a thorough background on this issue, see Oded 2000. 
16  Ndjozi 2000. This book is banned in Tanzania. 
17  Hamadouche 2002. 
 
 




On November 28, 2002, terrorists carried out two more attacks, this time 
near Mombasa. On the property of the Paradise Hotel, which is primarily 
visited by Israelis and located north of this coastal metropolis, explosives 
hidden inside a car went off, claiming 16 lives, including the three 
perpetrators (to this day, nothing has been revealed about their identity), and 
three Israeli tourists. At almost the same time at the airport in Mombasa, an 
Israeli charter plane with 261 passengers was shot at with two SAM-7 
missiles right after take-off, with that attack just narrowly missing its target. 
While a report came in from Beirut, saying the previously unknown Army of 
Palestine had claimed responsibility for that attack in a letter, a government 
spokesman in Washington suggested that the Somali organization al-Ittihad 
al-Islami, which is linked to al-Qa’ida, could be responsible for the two 
attacks.18 As in August 1998, Kenyan Muslim officials again spoke up, 
condemning terrorist attacks. An official SUPKEM statement read:  
Whoever planned and executed the bombing is definitely the number one enemy of 
Islam and Muslims of Kenya (...) We would like to assure (...) that the Muslims of 
Kenya will continue to co-exist with Kenyans of other faiths as they have always 
done.19 
According to the general opinion among East African Muslims, terrorism in 
Kenya and Tanzania is not a problem of Islam. Instead, it is a problem of 
security for the state, which is responsible for protecting its borders against 
external attackers. For that precise reason, the population of Zanzibar – 
more than 90% of which is Muslim – reacted with disgruntlement when the 
US State Department issued a terror warning for Zanzibar in January 2003, 
with many European governments following suit. The Zanzibaris simply 
ruled out the possibility of an attack carried out on “their” island, and the 
locals working in the tourism industry suggested that the warning was a 
conspiracy instigated by interested parties attempting to ruin Zanzibar’s 
booming business with foreign visitors. Considering the widespread 
rejection of terrorist violence among East African Muslims, the concern in 
U.S. intelligence circles – that the Muslim rage could turn into organized 
anti-American violence – is just as far-fetched as Mair’s thesis of an 
“indigenous African terrorism.” 
                                                 
18  http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2002-11/30/article53.shtml (December 3, 2002). 
Another report deals with the relatively strong Israeli presence in Kenya: Khaled Hanafi, 
Mombasa a strong message to Mossad in Africa, November 29, 2002 
 (http://www.islamonline.org/english/news/2002-11/29/article33.shtml, December 3, 2002). 
19  Quoted from http://www.islamonline.org/english/news/2002-11/29/article40.shtml 
(December 3, 2002). Al-Ittihad al-Islami is on the list that was created by the U.S. 
government after 9/11. Listed here are all terrorist organizations that are viewed as potential 
targets in the “war on terrorism.” See also Hamadouche 2002. 
 
 




In order to tackle the problem of mounting anti-Americanism, the US 
government has pursued a two-dimensional strategy in Africa since 
September 11, 2001. On the one hand, it has intensified its intelligence 
efforts in many sub-Saharan states.20 On the other hand, it has sought ways 
to counter the negative image that Muslims have of America. This strategy 
was based on the assumption that the tensions merely had to do with an 
“image problem” which could be solved with a public relations campaign. 
The US embassy in Nairobi assumed a leading role in these efforts. 
Members of the Public Affairs Section developed an Internet site providing 
regular updates on the “war on terror.” At the same time, the content clearly 
stresses that these measures do not target Islam but terrorist groups which 
unjustly use and cite Islam for their purposes. The peaceful coexistence of 
confessions in the United States is also described thoroughly on the site, and 
it is attributed to the Islam-friendly position of the government.21 At the 
same time, the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) tried to establish contacts with Muslim charity organizations, in 
order to explore the possibility of cooperation to provide support for needy 
Muslims.22  
However, it remains doubtful that the U.S. measures described here will 
be crowned with success. It is unlikely that the causes of anti-Americanism 
can be addressed by launching an image campaign, especially in view of the 
fact that the activities of the secret services continue to stir the mistrust 
among African Muslims. The anti-American mood among Kenyan Muslims 
notwithstanding, the decisive developments are not those which occur on 
the global or international level. Rather, it is the national and local level that 
will be crucial for the future of the Muslim minority in Kenya, as well as the 
prospects of Christian-Muslim understanding in the area. 
                                                 
20  In Kenya, the CIA worked closely with the national intelligence services (Hamadouche 
2002). Numerous U.S. diplomatic institutions also started gathering information on Islam in 
the respective countries. 
21  http://usembassy.state.gov/nairobi/wwwhtoc.html (December 3, 2002). 
22  Hamadouche 2002. The Public Affairs Section of the U.S. embassy also tried to initiate a 
cooperation with the Nairobi-based Islamic radio station Iqra FM (ibid.). 
 
 




Local vs. global matters 
As we have seen, one of the major effects of 9/11 has been the growing 
sense among Muslims in East Africa of belonging to the umma, i.e. the 
worldwide community of Muslims. They closely follow the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and the course of events in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
“solidarity with our Muslims brothers and sisters” has occupied an 
important place in the religious discourse, both formal (such as sermons, 
Muslim newspapers) and informal. Nevertheless, local and national matters 
are (still) more pressing than global issues. The representatives of 
organizations such as the Kenyan Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims 
(SUPKEM) or the Council of Imams and Preachers (CIP) regularly lament 
the discrimination of Muslims in the education system, as well as the 
Christian missionary conversion campaigns, which, at times, are aggressive 
and usually tolerated by the government.23 Other issues that are at stake in 
debates among Muslims relate to the position of women, the correct 
religious practice, matters of ritual, and the question of whether certain 
beliefs and practices of Kenyan Muslims have to be considered as 
“innovations” (Arabic, bida‘, sg. bid‘a), one of the major themes in 
reformist discourse. 
Two recent topics that have dominated the religious-political field in 
Kenya are the position of the so-called Kadhi courts in the new Kenyan 
constitution and the Anti-Terrorism Bill. Both matters can be said to be of 
crucial importance for the future development of the Muslim minority in the 
country. The row over the Kadhi courts basically evolves around the 
question of whether Muslims should be allowed to continue to decide 
matters of family law (basically marriage, divorce, inheritance) according to 
the sharî‘a, as they have used to do since the time of the British Protectorate 
(1895). Even though the Anti Terrorism Bill is directly linked to global 
developments in the aftermath of 9/11, the Kenyan debate clearly evolves 
around the local implications of the new legislation which many Muslims 
see as targeting their community more than any other religious and political 
group in the country. 
                                                 
23  In this regard, the situation, as it was described in 1993 by Ali Mazrui (one of the country’s 
most well-known Muslim intellectuals), has not changed much (Mazrui 1993). 
 
 




In the present political situation, Kenya is at the crossroads: Either the 
mounting tensions will be contained with Muslims being granted the status 
of a respected religious minority, or Muslims are likely to show an 
increasing tendency to withdraw from national politics. What is at stake here 
is not the “clash of civilizations”, but rather a process of negotiation of 
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